网络节点特征与城市绿色创新效率提升——基于节点枢纽性与节点聚集度视角

随着城市间创新联系的持续增强,城市创新网络的优化与发展对城市绿色创新效率的促进作用日益凸现。部分研究考察了城市绿色创新效率的空间溢出效应和城市创新网络特征的影响,但鲜有文献关注城市的网络节点特征对其绿色创新效率的影响,尤其缺乏相应的经验分析。本文认为,在城市创新网络中各个城市即网络中的节点,创新资源和活动在节点的聚集产生规模效应,创新资源和活动在节点间流动则带来溢出效应,两者都有利于城市绿色创新效率的提升。因此,反映节点在网络联系中重要性的节点枢纽性和反映网络中不同节点聚集成团程度的节点聚集度提高,均有利于城市绿色创新效率的提升。节点枢纽性的提高对城市自身的基础设施建设提出更高要求,因而可以通过改善基础设施的路径促进城市绿色创新效率提升;节点聚集度的提高为城市金融发展带来更多的需求和机会,因而可以通过增加创新投融资规模的路径促进城市绿色创新效率提升。在城市密度和经济发展水平较高的地区,城市间的创新联系较便利,节点枢纽性提高对城市绿色创新效率提升的促进作用较大;而在城市密度和经济发展水平较低的地区,创新聚集的效率相对较高,节点聚集度提高对城市绿色创新效率提升的促进作用较大。以2010—2018年中国279个城市为样本,通过引力模型构建城市创新网络,进而测度节点枢纽性和节点聚集度,分析发现：节点枢纽性和节点聚集度对城市绿色创新效率具有显著正向影响;城市交通基础设施在节点枢纽性促进城市绿色创新效率中具有显著的部分中介效应,城市金融机构存款水平在节点聚集度促进城市绿色创新效率中具有显著的遮掩效应;节点枢纽性对城市绿色创新效率的促进效应在东、中、西部地区依次减弱,而节点聚集度的促进效应依次增强。相比已有文献,本文主要从三个方面进行了拓展和深化：一是从网络节点特征角度拓展城市绿色创新效率的影响因素研究,二是从影响路径和区域异质性层面深化网络节点特征影响创新效率的机制研究,三是为通过改善网络节点特征促进绿色创新效率提升提供经验证据。本文揭示了城市创新网络进化（节点枢纽性与节点聚集度提高）对绿色创新效率提升的重要作用及其影响路径和区域异质性,有利于在新发展阶段通过优化城市网络发展格局进一步促进创新发展和绿色发展。     

Public sector enterprise disinvestment in India: Efficiency gains in a political context

India instituted a program of state enterprise disinvestment in 1991 as part of a sweeping reform initiative. This study analyses the effect of disinvestment on enterprise performance, conditioned on political context as characterized by the ideological leanings of the parties in power at state and central levels. Using stochastic frontier analysis, measures of firm efficiency are generated for 238 central public sector enterprises for the period 1991–1992 to 2010–2011. The relationship between efficiency so measured and disinvestment is then estimated using a two-stage instrumental variables approach to control for endogeneity between firm efficiency and selection for disinvestment. Initial disinvestment is associated with substantial efficiency gains, but subsequent disinvestment much less so and the proportion of shares disinvested only loosely so. This may be explained by the transformative effect of initial stock market listing on accountability and profit orientation that is not repeated with further rounds of disinvestment. The effect of disinvestment on performance is stronger if the enterprise is located in a state governed by a right leaning party or one that is ideologically aligned with the party in power at the centre.     

Fiscal rules to tame the political budget cycle: Evidence from Italian municipalities

The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It uses data on Italian municipalities during the 2000s and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian sub-national fiscal rule (Domestic Stability Pact, DSP) introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 10–20 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that municipalities subject to the DSP show a pre-electoral increase in capital spending which is only a quarter of the one of municipalities not subject to the rule.     

企业政治关联对风险投资引入方式的影响

从资金需求方出发，以2009年10月至2016年12月深圳创业板和中小板首次公开上市的公司为样本，实证检验了政治关联对风险投资引入方式的影响，以及激励机制和监督机制这两种公司治理机制的调节作用，得到结论如下：政治关联企业倾向于在发展后期引入风险投资；政治关联企业倾向于选择国有性质、经验丰富以及参与程度高的风险投资机构；激励机制会加强政治关联企业在发展后期引入风险投资以及选择国有性质、经验丰富、参与程度高的风险投资机构的意愿；监督机制会减弱政治关联企业在发展后期阶段引入风险投资以及选择国有性质、经验丰富、参与程度高的风险投资机构的意愿。结论对拓展政治关联与风险投资领域的理论和实践具有重要启示意义。     

Relative age effects in political selection

We exploit a regression discontinuity design to provide causal evidence of the relative age effect (RAE) on a long-run adult age outcome: Political selection. We find strong evidence of the RAE in politics in Finland. However, the effect is heterogeneous: We find that male candidates born early in the calendar year have a significantly higher probability of getting elected to the parliament but no similar RAE applies to female candidates nor to municipal elections. Moreover, this effect only takes place in the most competitive parliamentary districts and is present only for some parties. We also find that in all the groups where the RAE does not exist, early-born candidates are under-represented suggesting attrition of talent in the candidate placement. Overall, our results show that seemingly artificial cutoffs imposed by the government have persistent consequences even on the selection to the highest positions of power within a society.     

Local television,citizen knowledge and U.S. senators' roll-call voting

I study the effect of access to local television on citizens' political knowledge. I do so by utilizing the mismatch between U.S. television markets and state borders, causing some citizens to receive local television which primarily covers neighboring state politics. I find that access to relevant local television causes citizens to be more informed about their senators' roll-call votes, and more likely to hold opinions about these senators. I also find that citizens with access to relevant local television are more likely to assess their senators based on how well the senators' roll-call votes align with the citizens' policy preferences. These results suggest that passively acquired information through television can help individuals evaluate their elected representatives.     

Political competition,tax salience and accountability. Theory and evidence from Italy

This paper argues that electoral competition may hinder rather than foster political accountability, especially when elected officers can choose among a number of tax instruments. We develop a political agency model showing that politicians in more competitive jurisdictions use less salient tax instruments more intensely. Defining salience as visibility or, analogously, as voters' awareness of the costs associated with specific government revenue sources, we argue that voters are less likely to hold politicians to account for the associated tax burden of a less salient instrument. This in turn implies that strategic politicians will more heavily rely on less salient revenue sources when electoral competition is stronger. Using data on Italian municipal elections and taxes over a 10-year period, we determine the degree of salience of various tax instruments, including property taxes (high salience) and government fees for official documents (low salience). We then show that mayors facing stronger competition for re-election use less salient tax instruments more intensely.     

The Impact of Political Competition on Economic Growth: Evidence from Municipalities in South Africa

This paper examines the impact of political competition on economic growth. In this paper, I show that internal political dynamics, distinct from the type of political system, can having different effects on growth. Using results from the 1994 and 1999 elections in South Africa, I show that municipalities with higher levels of political competition have shown lower levels of economic growth. I use individual level surveys to show that this political competition is associated with political paralysis, dissatisfaction with the current democracy and government and lower optimism about the future.     

Is it the economic policy,stupid? Economic policy,political parties & the gubernatorial incumbent advantage

Incumbent politicians have a well-known advantage in seeking re-election. Using the Economic Freedom of North America dataset, we examine how changes in economic policy during an incumbent governor's tenure influence the probability of losing their re-election bid. Put simply, does economic policy matter for the incumbent advantage? The results suggest that a decrease in economic freedom increases the probability of an incumbent loss, regardless of the governor's party. A decomposition analysis indicates that these results are primarily driven by the government spending sub-index. Furthermore, a more granular analysis suggests that: (1) increases in government consumption spending and government employment are associated with a lower probability of re-election among Democratic incumbent governors, but a higher probability among Republicans; (2) increases in transfer payments relative to personal income reduce the likelihood of re-election, regardless of party; and (3) among Republican incumbents, increases of income taxation and of top marginal tax rates are associated with a higher and lower, respectively, probability of losing re-election. Finally, controlling for a variety of demographic, political and socioeconomic factors, we find that high unemployment increases the probability that an incumbent loses re-election, while increasing net population migration reduces it.     

Do networks or performance impact the promotion of Chinese officials? Evidence from prefecture‐level cities

This study examines the effects of connections and economic performance on the promotion of Chinese city mayors. Our study differs from the published literature in four respects. First, this study covers a comprehensive data set, including 1,422 mayors from 284 prefecture‐level cities. The use of a large data set helps resolve mixed results of past studies. Second, we use a broader range of top leaders. Third, we apply a more comprehensive definition of connections than earlier studies. Finally, we examine the effects of the policy shift of the 11th 5‐year plan on promotion of mayors. Our results reveal that the performance of a city mayor assisted his/her promotion to party secretary before 2006 but not afterwards. However, a mayor's connection with five types of top leaders is helpful. Among the four types of connection, colleagueship is the most effective in expediting the promotion of mayors. Graduating from the same university and department is also helpful but to a lesser extent. Township connection is not useful.